There was a time when American political leadership understood that some national objectives were bigger than any president, any political party, or any election.
We disagreed on implementation. We disagreed on spending, military strategy, diplomacy, taxation, and the role of government.
But we understood something that seems increasingly lost today:
YOU CAN DISAGREE ON HOW TO ACCOMPLISH SOMETHING WITHOUT ABANDONING THE OBJECTIVE ITSELF.
And perhaps more importantly, we understood that certain objectives required sacrifice.
REAL sacrifice.
Not just higher grocery prices or expensive gasoline. Not simply enduring economic discomfort while waiting for a policy to produce results.
I'm talking about entire generations committing resources, accepting enormous economic trade-offs, and pursuing national objectives that no single president could guarantee would succeed.
And what's particularly frustrating is that we have historical examples of America confronting threats remarkably similar to those we face today.
WE ONCE MOBILIZED AN ENORMOUS SCIENTIFIC AND INDUSTRIAL EFFORT BECAUSE WE FEARED NAZI GERMANY MIGHT DEVELOP AN ATOMIC BOMB.
Today, we're confronting the possibility of Iran developing nuclear weapons.
The circumstances are different. The capabilities, geopolitical environment, and available policy options are different.
But the underlying strategic question is familiar:
WHAT ARE WE WILLING TO DO, WHAT ARE WE WILLING TO SACRIFICE, AND HOW LONG ARE WE WILLING TO REMAIN COMMITTED TO PREVENTING A HOSTILE REGIME FROM ACQUIRING A NUCLEAR WEAPON?
Look at World War II.
In 1939, Albert Einstein and physicist Leo Szilard warned President Franklin D. Roosevelt that Nazi Germany might pursue extraordinarily powerful weapons using nuclear fission.
American policymakers faced an uncertain but potentially catastrophic threat.
They didn't know whether Germany could successfully develop an atomic bomb.
They didn't know how far German research had progressed.
They didn't know whether the United States could develop the necessary technology first.
But they recognized that the consequences of being wrong could be devastating.
And what did America do?
We eventually launched one of the most ambitious scientific and industrial undertakings in human history.
THE MANHATTAN PROJECT.
It cost approximately $2 billion in 1940s dollars and employed roughly 130,000 people at its peak.
We built enormous facilities at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and Hanford, Washington.
We assembled leading scientists, engineers, military officials, and industrial organizations.
We invested in technologies that had never been demonstrated at the necessary scale.
And we did all of this while fighting a global war.
WE COMMITTED ENORMOUS RESOURCES TO PREVENTING A POTENTIALLY CATASTROPHIC STRATEGIC DISADVANTAGE, EVEN WITHOUT KNOWING WHETHER THE THREAT WOULD MATERIALIZE.
Germany surrendered before the first successful American atomic test in July 1945. Later evidence showed that Germany's nuclear weapons effort was far less advanced than American officials initially feared.
The project ultimately produced the weapons used against Japan, not Germany.
But the original fear of a Nazi atomic bomb was an important reason the United States began pursuing the technology.
And the strategic lesson is worth remembering.
We didn't wait for Germany to demonstrate a working atomic weapon before recognizing the potential danger.
We assessed the threat, considered the consequences, and committed resources to ensuring that America would not be left strategically defenseless.
Now look at Iran.
For decades, the United States has sought to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
And just as American officials once faced uncertainty about Nazi Germany's nuclear progress, modern policymakers have faced uncertainty about Iran's intentions, technical capabilities, enrichment activities, and potential decisions regarding weaponization.
The historical situations aren't identical.
Nazi Germany was engaged in a world war and pursuing territorial conquest on an enormous scale. Iran operates in a different strategic environment, under international monitoring arrangements and within a complicated regional balance of power.
But both cases raise the same fundamental national security problem:
HOW DO YOU PREVENT A HOSTILE GOVERNMENT FROM ACQUIRING A CAPABILITY THAT COULD DRAMATICALLY CHANGE THE STRATEGIC BALANCE?
And here's where the comparison becomes particularly revealing.
During World War II, America was willing to commit extraordinary scientific, industrial, and financial resources to confronting that possibility.
Today, Democrats and Republicans generally agree that preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons is an important national security objective.
Yet we struggle to maintain a durable agreement on how to achieve it.
Obama negotiated the 2015 nuclear agreement, which imposed restrictions and monitoring requirements on Iran's nuclear activities in exchange for sanctions relief.
Trump withdrew from that agreement in 2018, arguing that its weaknesses required a stronger approach, and reinstated sanctions under a maximum-pressure strategy.
Biden attempted to restore negotiations, but those efforts failed.
Subsequent years brought additional sanctions, military escalation, strikes against Iranian nuclear infrastructure, and renewed diplomatic efforts.
Different presidents. Different parties. Different strategies.
And the underlying problem has remained unresolved.
I'm not arguing that the 2015 nuclear agreement was perfect.
I'm not arguing that withdrawing from it was automatically wrong.
I'm not arguing that sanctions alone could have solved the problem or that military action is always justified.
I'm asking something much more fundamental.
WHY CAN'T WE ESTABLISH A LONG-TERM STRATEGY FOR PREVENTING IRAN FROM ACQUIRING NUCLEAR WEAPONS THAT SURVIVES A CHANGE IN ADMINISTRATION?
During World War II, America pursued an extraordinarily expensive scientific and industrial program because policymakers feared the consequences of a hostile regime acquiring nuclear weapons first.
Today, we're debating the same general category of strategic danger, but we cannot maintain a consistent political framework for addressing it.
And no, that doesn't mean we should launch another Manhattan Project or treat Iran as identical to Nazi Germany.
The lesson isn't that every nuclear threat requires the same response.
The lesson is that A SERIOUS NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVE REQUIRES MORE THAN A FOUR-YEAR POLITICAL COMMITMENT.
It requires continuity.
It requires strategic patience.
It requires evaluating policies based on whether they advance the objective rather than which party proposed them.
And it requires accepting that preventing a catastrophic outcome may involve real economic costs.
Because preventing nuclear proliferation isn't free.
Sanctions have economic consequences.
Military readiness costs money.
Intelligence operations cost money.
International monitoring and diplomatic efforts require resources.
And military confrontation, if it occurs, can carry enormous financial, geopolitical, and human costs.
Those costs need to be evaluated carefully.
But pretending we can protect national security without making difficult trade-offs is ridiculous.
THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS A COST-FREE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY.
And the Manhattan Project wasn't the only example of America's willingness to sustain long-term commitments.
Look at the Cold War.
For approximately 44 years, nine American presidents from both parties maintained a broad commitment to containing Soviet expansion.
Truman established the foundation.
Eisenhower strengthened deterrence and alliances.
Kennedy confronted Soviet pressure during the Berlin and Cuban Missile crises.
Nixon pursued détente and strategic diplomacy.
Carter adjusted his approach following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
Reagan intensified competition while pursuing arms-control negotiations.
George H. W. Bush managed the final stages of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
NINE PRESIDENTS. TWO PARTIES. MORE THAN FOUR DECADES OF STRATEGIC CONTINUITY.
They didn't agree on everything.
Not even close.
But they recognized that the underlying national objective transcended individual administrations.
And America paid for that commitment.
We maintained military installations around the world, supported international alliances, developed nuclear deterrence capabilities, funded defense research, and committed substantial portions of our economic output to competing with Soviet power.
At certain points during the Cold War, defense spending exceeded 9% of GDP.
Those were real economic trade-offs.
Resources devoted to defense couldn't simultaneously be devoted to every domestic priority.
Yet successive administrations maintained the broader commitment because they believed the consequences of unchecked Soviet expansion could be far worse.
WE WERE WILLING TO INVEST DECADES OF RESOURCES INTO OBJECTIVES THAT NO SINGLE PRESIDENT COULD GUARANTEE WOULD SUCCEED.
Now look at what happened afterward.
In 2008, Russia invaded Georgia during George W. Bush's presidency.
The administration condemned the invasion, supported diplomatic efforts, and provided assistance.
But the response failed to reverse Russia's territorial gains.
In 2014, Russia invaded Ukraine and annexed Crimea during Barack Obama's presidency.
Obama imposed sanctions, supported diplomatic isolation, and provided nonlethal military assistance.
But he declined to provide Ukraine with lethal defensive weapons, despite arguments that doing so could strengthen deterrence.
Russia retained Crimea.
Then, in 2022, Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Different presidents. Different parties. Repeated aggression.
I'm not claiming Bush or Obama caused Russia's invasions. Russia bears responsibility for its own actions.
I'm also not claiming that stronger military assistance would necessarily have prevented subsequent aggression.
But we absolutely should question whether successive American administrations developed a sufficiently effective strategy for deterring Russia's renewed territorial ambitions.
WE SPENT DECADES CONTAINING SOVIET EXPANSION, ONLY TO STRUGGLE WITH HOW TO RESPOND WHEN RUSSIA BEGAN EXPANDING AGAIN.
And now we're facing a comparable problem of strategic continuity with Iran.
We know the objective.
We understand the stakes.
We recognize the potential consequences of nuclear proliferation.
Yet the methods change dramatically with each administration.
And that brings me to something much bigger than Russia or Iran.
WHAT HAPPENED TO OUR POLITICAL CULTURE?
How did we go from a country capable of sustaining national objectives for generations to one where nearly every major issue becomes another partisan identity contest?
The change didn't happen overnight.
But in historical terms, the acceleration has been astonishing.
Consider the political landscape of the 1990s compared with the 2010s and 2020s.
According to Pew Research Center, in 1994 approximately 10% of Americans held consistently liberal or consistently conservative positions across a broad range of political issues.
By 2014, that proportion had doubled to 21%.
And the hostility between political parties intensified dramatically.
In 1994, only 16% of Democrats and 17% of Republicans expressed very unfavorable views of the opposing party.
By 2014, those figures had climbed to 38% and 43%, respectively.
By 2022, Pew found that 63% of Democrats regarded Republicans as more immoral than other Americans, while 72% of Republicans said the same about Democrats.
THINK ABOUT THAT.
We've moved beyond simply believing that the other party has bad policies.
Increasingly, Americans believe the people supporting those policies are themselves morally defective.
And that's an enormous difference.
Because when politics becomes a contest between people who merely disagree, compromise is possible.
When politics becomes a contest between people who believe their opponents are fundamentally immoral, compromise starts looking like betrayal.
WE STOPPED ARGUING ONLY ABOUT WHAT PEOPLE BELIEVE AND STARTED JUDGING WHAT KIND OF PEOPLE THEY ARE.
And I think modern progressive liberalism played a significant role in accelerating that transformation.
Now, I'm not arguing that classical liberalism, civil rights, or equal protection under the law are inherently destructive.
Those principles have contributed enormously to American political development.
I'm talking about the increasingly identity-centered framework within contemporary progressive politics.
The tendency to interpret political and economic disagreements primarily through categories of race, gender, sexuality, historical disadvantage, privilege, and group power.
Those categories can illuminate genuine inequalities and legitimate grievances.
But problems emerge when identity becomes the dominant framework through which nearly every political question is evaluated.
When the perceived identity of the person making an argument becomes more important than the argument itself.
When disagreement over policy is treated as evidence of prejudice.
When economic outcomes are evaluated primarily through group disparities without adequately examining productivity, incentives, institutions, or other contributing factors.
And when political legitimacy becomes tied to demonstrating allegiance to a particular moral or cultural identity.
THAT'S WHERE POLITICS STOPS BEING PRIMARILY ABOUT SOLVING PROBLEMS AND STARTS BECOMING ABOUT PROVING YOU BELONG TO THE RIGHT SIDE.
But here's what makes this even more concerning.
The influence didn't remain confined to progressive politics.
It spread across the political spectrum.
Conservatives increasingly organized around their own forms of cultural identity, religious identity, national identity, and opposition to progressive institutions.
Political parties became more than organizations advocating competing policies.
They became social identities.
Being a Democrat or Republican increasingly came to signify what cultural communities you belonged to, which institutions you trusted, what media you consumed, and what kinds of people you considered allies or adversaries.
And once that happened, political disagreement became personal.
POLITICS STOPPED BEING SOMETHING PEOPLE PARTICIPATED IN AND STARTED BECOMING SOMETHING PEOPLE IDENTIFIED AS.
That's an extraordinarily dangerous development for a country that depends on democratic compromise.
Because identity isn't evaluated the same way as policy.
A policy can fail.
An economic forecast can be wrong.
A military strategy can produce unintended consequences.
A government program can become fiscally unsustainable.
Those things can be measured, criticized, and corrected.
But when a policy becomes part of someone's political identity, admitting that it failed can feel like admitting that THEY failed.
And when a political party becomes part of someone's moral identity, criticizing that party can feel like a personal attack.
NOW WE HAVE A SYSTEM WHERE PEOPLE DEFEND POLICIES BECAUSE OF WHO PROPOSED THEM, NOT NECESSARILY BECAUSE THE POLICIES WORK.
And this is where identity politics begins contaminating other dimensions of political decision-making.
Look at economics.
Instead of consistently evaluating policies based on productivity, fiscal sustainability, incentive effects, and measurable outcomes, debates increasingly become arguments about which groups deserve resources and which groups are supposedly responsible for economic hardship.
Look at healthcare.
Instead of beginning with costs, administrative efficiency, access, quality, and financing, discussions frequently become moral contests over who cares about people and who supposedly doesn't.
Look at immigration.
Instead of consistently evaluating border security, labor-market effects, legal processes, humanitarian obligations, and enforcement capacity, the debate becomes entangled with competing accusations about national identity, compassion, prejudice, and loyalty.
Look at energy policy.
Instead of weighing reliability, affordability, environmental consequences, technological feasibility, and national security, energy choices increasingly become symbols of political allegiance.
And look at foreign policy.
Instead of asking whether a strategy credibly advances American security interests, politicians and voters often begin by asking which administration proposed it.
THE QUESTION BECOMES "WHOSE POLICY IS THIS?" INSTEAD OF "DOES THIS POLICY ACTUALLY WORK?"
And that's how political identity can spread into areas where the consequences are far more serious than cultural disagreement.
Because Russia doesn't care whether our deterrence strategy is progressive or conservative.
Iran doesn't care whether our nuclear policy appeals to Democrats or Republicans.
China doesn't care whether our industrial policy satisfies the cultural priorities of either party.
Our adversaries care about American capabilities, credibility, incentives, and willingness to act.
THEY RESPOND TO CONSEQUENCES, NOT OUR CLAIMS OF MORAL SUPERIORITY.
And I want to be clear about something.
Progressive identity politics did not single-handedly create American polarization.
Partisan sorting, ideological media, economic change, declining institutional trust, geographic divisions, and conservative identity movements all contributed.
But I believe the increasing tendency to moralize political disagreement through group identity helped normalize a particularly destructive way of thinking.
The assumption that political opponents aren't simply mistaken.
They're bad people.
And once that becomes the default assumption, what incentive is there to cooperate?
Why preserve a useful policy implemented by somebody you believe is morally illegitimate?
Why acknowledge that the opposing party made a good decision?
Why compromise when your political community might interpret compromise as surrender?
WHY THINK ABOUT WHAT'S BEST FOR THE COUNTRY WHEN YOUR POLITICAL IDENTITY DEMANDS THAT THE OTHER SIDE MUST LOSE?
And that brings us back to the contrast with earlier generations.
During World War II, Americans accepted extraordinary economic sacrifices to defeat the Axis powers.
During the Cold War, Republican and Democratic administrations sustained a broad strategic commitment despite enormous disagreements over implementation.
That doesn't mean those eras were politically harmonious.
They weren't.
There were fierce ideological conflicts, discrimination, political repression, protests, and serious disagreements about American foreign policy.
But the country demonstrated an ability to maintain certain long-term commitments despite those divisions.
Today, our political disagreements increasingly extend beyond policy into questions of identity, morality, and social belonging.
And I think that has made strategic continuity substantially more difficult.
Because once politics becomes an identity contest, the success of a policy can become less important than whether your side receives credit.
A Republican administration can pursue a policy that Democrats might otherwise support, and some Democrats will oppose it because of who proposed it.
A Democratic administration can pursue a policy that Republicans might otherwise support, and some Republicans will do the same.
THE OBJECTIVE BECOMES DEFEATING THE OPPOSITION, EVEN WHEN THAT MEANS UNDERMINING SOMETHING THAT COULD BENEFIT THE COUNTRY.
And the consequences don't disappear when the election ends.
National debt continues accumulating.
Military threats continue evolving.
Infrastructure continues deteriorating.
Economic decisions continue affecting investment.
International allies continue evaluating American credibility.
And geopolitical adversaries continue pursuing their objectives.
THE WORLD DOES NOT RESET EVERY FOUR YEARS JUST BECAUSE OUR GOVERNMENT DOES.
This is why I keep returning to the importance of long-term thinking.
Not every period of economic discomfort means a policy has failed.
Not every change in political leadership should require abandoning an existing national objective.
And not every disagreement over implementation needs to become a referendum on someone's morality.
Sometimes a policy is wrong and should be abandoned.
Sometimes a policy is correct but poorly executed.
Sometimes the costs are greater than anticipated.
And sometimes a legitimate objective requires sacrifices that won't produce immediate benefits.
The responsibility of voters and political leaders is to distinguish between those situations.
Not simply defend whatever their political identity demands.
GOOD POLICY DOESN'T BECOME BAD BECAUSE A REPUBLICAN PROPOSED IT.
BAD POLICY DOESN'T BECOME GOOD BECAUSE A DEMOCRAT PROPOSED IT.
And the reverse is equally true.
The legitimacy of a national objective should be determined by its consequences, feasibility, costs, and relationship to American interests.
Not by the political identity of the person advocating it.
That's the kind of thinking that allowed America to maintain long-term strategic commitments in the past.
And it's the kind of thinking we desperately need to recover.
Because here's the reality:
POLITICAL VICTORY AND NATIONAL SUCCESS ARE NOT THE SAME THING.
A party can win an election while the country loses strategic ground.
A president can gain popularity by promising immediate relief while creating enormous future obligations.
Voters can punish an incumbent without adequately considering whether the replacement offers a better long-term strategy.
And political movements can convince themselves they're morally superior while producing policies that fail to accomplish their stated objectives.
That's why morality alone is not enough.
Good intentions aren't enough.
Political identity isn't enough.
RESULTS MATTER. INCENTIVES MATTER. RESOURCES MATTER. CONSEQUENCES MATTER.
We need to recover the ability to evaluate policies independently of the people proposing them.
We need to distinguish disagreement from moral condemnation.
We need to stop treating every political opponent as an enemy.
And we need to recognize that the country's long-term interests are bigger than the cultural identities of its political parties.
Because the alternative is a political system increasingly incapable of sustaining anything beyond the next election.
A system where each administration spends its first years reversing the previous administration's priorities.
Where long-term investment becomes uncertain.
Where international commitments become less credible.
Where every disagreement becomes a cultural conflict.
And where political loyalty matters more than institutional competence.
WE USED TO ARGUE ABOUT HOW TO ACCOMPLISH NATIONAL OBJECTIVES. NOW WE ARGUE ABOUT WHETHER THE PEOPLE PROPOSING THEM ARE MORALLY ACCEPTABLE.
That is not progress.
That is a deterioration in our ability to govern ourselves effectively.
We spent decades containing Soviet expansion.
We invested enormous resources in defending European security.
We built alliances, institutions, and military capabilities intended to protect American interests across generations.
Yet when Russia renewed its territorial aggression, successive administrations struggled to establish effective deterrence.
And when confronted with Iran's nuclear program, we struggled to maintain a durable consensus over implementation despite broad agreement on the underlying objective.
These failures have multiple causes, and political polarization is only one of them.
But the growing inability to separate national strategy from partisan identity makes solving them harder.
WE CANNOT AFFORD TO MAKE EVERY NATIONAL OBJECTIVE A CASUALTY OF OUR DOMESTIC CULTURE WARS.
We don't need Americans to agree on everything.
We need them to recognize that disagreement doesn't automatically make someone immoral.
That compromise doesn't automatically mean surrender.
That sacrifice doesn't automatically mean failure.
And that the future of the country matters more than proving that your political tribe was right.
Because history doesn't care whether a policy was progressive or conservative.
It doesn't care whether Democrats or Republicans received the credit.
It cares about what actually happened.
What worked.
What failed.
What we sacrificed.
And what consequences we left for the generations that followed.
WE USED TO THINK IN GENERATIONS. NOW WE STRUGGLE TO THINK PAST THE NEXT ELECTION.
And perhaps the most dangerous part isn't that we've forgotten how to agree.
IT'S THAT WE'VE STARTED TREATING THE VERY IDEA OF AGREEING WITH OUR POLITICAL OPPONENTS AS A BETRAYAL OF WHO WE ARE.
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